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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW- 1957
Survey of Ohio Law-1957
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
Exclusive Administrative Jurisdiction
While Ohio has no comprehensive labor statutes establishing an ad-
ministrative procedure for the adjudication of unfair labor practices,
recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States' indicate that
no state agency, administrative or judicial, has any jurisdiction over un-
fair labor practices which come within the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board, even -though the Board has declined to exercise
jurisdiction without at the same time ceding jurisdiction to state agencies.
Thus, no Ohio court may interfere in a labor dispute with respect to
the unfair labor practice aspects in any case in which interstate com-
merce is affected3' The exclusive remedy is through the federal agency,
and, if the federal agency declines to take jurisdiction, there is no state
injunctive remedy available.3
Two important Ohio decisions4 during 1957 outlined -those matters
with which the state may still deal despite exclusive federal administra-
rive jurisdiction over unfair labor practices relative to interstate com-
merce. In the extended litigation under the -title of Richman Bros. Co. v.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers,5 the court of appeals summarized the
jurisdiction -remaining in the state courts to deal with mass picketing:
a state court has jurisdiction to enjoin such picketing or other course
of conduct which interferes with the means of ingress and egress to and
from the employer's place of business and interferes with pedestrial or
vehicular traffic 'in and about the place of business. Also the state court
'Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd. 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Amalgamated Meat Cut-
ters & Butcher Workmen of North America v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc, 353 U.S. 20
(1957); San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
'Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S.
20 (1957), holding that a court of common pleas had no jurisdiction to enjoin
union conduct of a kind which was regulated by the National Labor Relations Act.
(The injunction was issued against picketing, trespassing, and exerting secondary
pressures on the petitioner's suppliers.) The Court did not pass on the issue of jur-
isdiction to enjoin trespassing on petitioner's real property because the state decree
was based on state power to reach union conduct in its entirety.
'In United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656
(1953), the Supreme Court decided that the jurisdiction of the National Labor Re-
lations Board over unfair labor practices did not preclude a common-law action for
damages against the perpetrators of the unfair labor practices.
' The general significance of these two Ohio cases will be developed in the later sur-
vey article on Labor Law.
-144 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
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-has jurisdiction 'to enjoin activity which is contrary to law and order and
the peace and dignity of the state of Ohio.
Out of ,the Standard Oil strike of the mid-year came another decision
which points to another ground for a state equity court's intervention in
a labor dispute over which the federal agency has almost exclusive juris-
diction. In the Standard Oil Company v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers International Union6 case, .the court granted a permanent in-
junction against picketing or other concerted activity to prevent an in-
ducement or any inducement to -breach an existing contract between an
employer and another union.
Dible v. United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry7 points to the importance of evidence
in ,the record to show that petitioner was engaged dn work affecting inter-
state commerce, -to oust the state courts of jurisdiction. In the absence of
evidence which shows that -the plaintiff was engaged in interstate com-
merce or that he was engaged in work or activity affecting commerce
-between the states, the state court does have jurisdiction to protect the
plaintiff in a labor controversy.
Under Section 4905.04, Ohio Revised Code, the Public Utilities Com-
mission is vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate
"public 'utilities and Railroads" and to require all public utilities 'to fur-
nish their products and render their services exacted .by 'the commission
or by law, and the Supreme Court alone has power to review orders of
the Public Utilities Commission.8  The existence of this exclusive ad-
ministrative jurisdiction-review procedure does not deprive a court of
equity of its jurisdiction to prevent a utility from depriving a petitioner
of his property rights without due process of law.
In Laffer v. Cincinnati & Suburban Bell Telephone Co.,9 the com-
mon pleas court issued a temporary mandatory injunction requiring the
defendant to restore telephone service to -the plaintiffs, -placing the duty
upon the plaintiffs to initiate a complaint forthwith with -the Public
e 144 N.E.2d 517 (Ohio C.P. 1957). This decision is based upon the Ohio rule
that equity may interfere to prevent the inducement of a breach of contract when
damages cannot provide an adequate remedy.
'101 Ohio App. 233, 139 N.E.2d 57 (1955). This was a trial de novo on an ap-
peal on questions of law and fact upon a petition seeking to enjoin the defendant
local and its business agent from picketing a job undertaken by the plaintiff and
completed before the hearing in the court of appeals. Thus, at the time of the hear-
ing in the appellate court, the question had become moot except with respect to the
costs, and the court of appeals determined that there was jurisdiction in the court of
common pleas and that the plaintiff was entitled to his costs. The cause was then
dismissed at the defendants' costs.
"Northern Ohio Telephone Co. v. Putnam, 164 Ohio St. 238, 130 N.E.2d 91
(1955).
- 144 N.E.2d 158 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
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Utilities Commission to determine the merits of their cause. The court
did not pass upon any power of -the Commission after hearing to order
discontinuance of service for the use of a utility facility dn gambling
operations, but did determine that equity has the power to retain the
status quo until a matter has been heard on its merits.
Necessity of Adhering to Agency Rules
State v. Industrial Commission"1 considers the nature of regularly
adopted agency rules of procedure for appellate review within the
agency and the consequences of a failure of the appellate body to fol-
low such rules. A district board of claims had held a hearing on a
disability claim and granted a -permanent partial disability award. The
Industrial Commission granted a hearing on the board's findings and
considered additional evidence than that in -the record, despite -the fact
that its rules forbade a review unless it appeared that the action of the
board of claims was clearly against the weight of the evidence or con-
trary to law, and in the event of a hearing only the evidence contained
in the claim record can -be considered. The court of appeals issued an
original writ of mandamus -to reinstate the award of the -board of claims,
stating -that the regularly adopted rules of the commission are a part of
the law of the state, and that the commission abused its discretion in
disregarding the -two rules mentioned.
Agency Proceedings
In Re Slavens1 -raised an issue as to the requirements of a quorum
necessary to enable an agency to act when the basic statute -is silent on
the number of members required to transact -business. The Supreme
Court states that an agency of three or more members may act through
a majority of a quorum, consisting of a majority of the members, pro-
vided all members had notice and an opportunity to be present. Fur-
thermore, in the absence of evidence in the record showing to the con-
trary, notice to all members is presumed and all are regarded as con-
structively .present.
Codosky v. Department of Liquor Control0 2 indicates that an agency
must permit a party who has summoned witnesses who have failed to
obey ,the summons, to present the oral testimony of such witnesses at the
first opportunity they are available, when he desires to present them in
person and the hearing is still open when -the request is made.
10144 N.E.2d 117 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
' 166 Ohio St. 285, 141 N.E.2d 887 (1957).
12139 N.E.2d 690 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
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Necessity for Specific Charge in Notice of Hearing on
License Revocation
Section 119.07, Ohio Revised Code, requires any agency -to include
in its notice the charges or other reasons for proposed license revocation,
and the law or rule directly involved. When a notice charged the
violation of a specified numbered section of the Certificate of Motor
Vehicle Title Laws and the findings of the Ohio Motor Vehicle Dealer's
and Salesmen's Licensing Board specified another, -the resulting order is
invalid for non-compliance with the Ohio Administrative Procedure
Act.13
Judicial Review
Appeal by an agency from the adverse decision of the common pleas
court is dearly permitted under the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act.
Section 119.12, Ohio Revised Code, authorizes the agency to appeal.
Katz v. Department of Liquor Control'4 decided that this right of the
agency to appeal did not exist when the adverse decision is challenged
solely on the ground that the order is not supported by any reliable, pro-
bative, and substantial evidence in the record. Stated in another way,
the agency may appeal only upon questions of law relating to the con-
stitutionality, construction, or interpretation of statutes and the rules and
regulations of the agency.1
Perfecting the Appeal
The general policy where a statute confers the right of appeal is to
insist upon adherence to -the requirements of the statute as a condition
of the enjoyment of the right.'6 In Kendall v. Adm'r. and Board of Review,
" Ohio Motor Vehicle Dealer's and Salesmen's Licensing Board v. Memphis Auto
Sales, 103 Ohio App. 347, 142 N.E.2d 268 (1957). However, the most important
holding of the court is that OHIO REv. CODE § 4517.06, which sought to restrict
retail sales of new motor vehicles to such persons who have a franchise from the
manufacturer of the automobile was invalid and violative of the 14th amendment,
of the United States Constitution and of Art. 1, Sec. 1, Ohio Constitution, together
with rules issued thereunder.
', 166 Ohio St. 229, 141 N.E.2d 294 (1957). For the decision in the court of ap-
peals see, 145 N.E.2d 553 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956). If the agency has standing to
appeal, then the court of appeals, upon a properly perfected appeal, has jurisdiction
to review and determine the correctness of the judgment of the original reviewing
court on matters of law and fact, with power to reverse an order which is not sup-
ported by any reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the record. Such is the
specific language of OHIO REV. CODE § 119.12.
For a similar holding, see Burkhart v. Dep't. of Liquor Control, 144 N.E.2d 282
(Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
'Queen City Valve, Inc. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 579, 120 N.E.2d 310 (1954).
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Bureau of Unemployment Compensation," a claimant who had been
denied an award failed to make the base period employer a party and
also to mail the employer a copy of the notice of appeal within 30 days
after receiving the Board's decision. Compliance with -these statutory
requirements was held jurisdictional. It is likewise necessary that 'the
appellant from an adverse court decision reviewing an administrative
agency, observe the rules of the court of appeals on the filing of an
assignment of error and brief to avoid a dismissal of his appeal.' 8
Perfection of the appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission
in a workmen's compensation claim serves -to deprive the Industrial Com-
mission of jurisdiction for any other proceeding while the common pleas
court is considering -the certified record and transcript.'"
Scope of Review Under Ohio Administrative Procedure:
Acting on the Entire Record
Andrews v. Board of Liquor Control20 held that .the amended pro-
visions of Section 119.12, Ohio Revised Code, provided for a judicial
review more extensive than a consideration of questions of law 'but
somewhat short of a complete trial de novo. Two Franklin County Court
of Appeals decisions provide additional insight into the meaning of this
review by the court of common pleas. Burger v. Board of Liquor Con-
trolP' points out that Andrews case holds that the review in the
common pleas court is a modified trial de novo, and it is error for the
court to hear the appeal as upon questions of law without considering
the evidence in the record. While dt is the duty of the court to sustain
the administrative order when supported 'by -reliable, probative and sub-
stantial evidence, and in accordance with law, Petropulos v. Board of
Liquor Contro2 points out that -the common pleas judge must review
the record and such additional evidence as 'he may authorize admitted at
the hearing, and make a finding that the order is supported by reliable,
11145 N.E.2d 415 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
'Ray v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 145 N.E.2d 417 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952). The ad-
ministrative agency was the appellant and sought to show mitigating circumstances
for its failure to comply and further that its delay would not cause interruption in
the orderly hearing of cases before the court. Appellee's motion to dismiss was
granted.
"The common pleas court could not remand the record to the Commission for the
taking of additional testimony. Firth v. Industrial Comm'n., 145 N.E.2d 215 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1957).
0 164 Ohio St. 275, 131 N.E.2d 390 (1955). Also see comment, 1956 Survey, 8
WEsT. REs. L. REv. 247, 248 (1957).
' 141 N.E.2d 671 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
' 141 N.B.2d 768 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
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probative, and substantial evidence. This necessitates an actual appraisal
of the evidence as to its probative character, the weight given to it and
the credibility of the witnesses.
As previously indicated, an administrative agency may appeal from
the decision of the common pleas court only when it puts in issue some
question of law ,relating to the constitutionality, construction or inter-
pretation of statutes and rules and regulations of the agency, but once
-the appeal -is -properly taken, the court of appeals has jurisdiction to pass
upon the questions of law presented and determine the correctness of the
judgment of the court that the order of the agency is or is not supported
by any reliable, probative and substantial evidence.28  The appeal from
the court of common pleas to -the court of appeals is governed by the
statutes relating to appeals in civil cases.24
Evidence
As previously indicated the appeal from an administrative agency
decision under Section 119.12, Ohio Revised Code, is as a modified trial
de novo in the common pleas court 'in which the judge must consider
the evidence in the record and find that the order is supported by reliable,
probative and substantial evidence, not merely that there is such evi-
dence in the record from which 'the agency could have found as it did.2 5
Of the common pleas decisions considered in this study, there are
several examples of decisions reversing2 6 as well as sustaining27 the orders
of the agency on the issue of adequate evidence. There seems to be a
'Katz v. Dep't. of Liquor Control, 166 Ohio St. 229, 141 N.E.2d 294 (1957).
2'OHIo Rv. CODE, § 119.12. This section incorporates by reference the appeals
provisions set forth in OHIO REV. CODE, §§ 2505.01-.45.
2 See cases cited in notes 21, 22, supra.
'Kostecki v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 139 N.E.2d 493 (Ohio C.P. 1956); Mangold
v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 145 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio C.P. 1956); Collinwood Sloven-
ian Home Co. v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 144 N.E.2d 912 (Ohio C.P. 1956); Khoury
v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 141 N.E.2d 792 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
'Hanigosky v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 144 N.E.2d 351 (Ohio C.P. 1956); Khoury
v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 141 N.E.2d 787 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
'
5For example, the opinion of Judge Baitlett, in Mangold v. Bd. of Liquor Control,
145 N.E.2d 500 (Ohio C.P. 1956), contains the following paragraph: 'The Court,
on consideration of the entire record, fails to find that the order of said Board is
supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence; and, therefore, reverses said
order and sustains the appeal therefrom."
Compare two common pleas opinions supporting decisions affirming the orders
of the Board, rendered prior to the Supreme Court decision in the Andrews case,
supra note 20: Kleinman v. Dep't. of Liquor Control, 140 N.E.2d 77 (Ohio C.P.
1954); 111 Bar, Inc. v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 143 N.E.2d 494 (Ohio C.P. 1955).
In the latter decision, the opinion of Judge Marshall contains the following para-
graph: "We believe that the order of the Bd. of Liquor Control is supported by re-
liable, probative and substantial evidence, and is in accordance with law .. "
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more critical attitude28 in the common pleas decisions since the decision
of the Supreme Court in Andrews v. Board of Liquor Control."
On appeal from the common -pleas court to the court of appeals, the
latter has a dual task when the trial judge has conscientiously applied
Section 119.12. Before proceeding further, it must determine that the
common pleas judge has considered the whole record and exercised his
judgment in arriving at his decision, 0 and if it appears that this -has been
done, it must then examine the record -to determine whether there is
reliable, probative and substantial evidence upon which the judge could
base -the decision he reached.3 ' The court of appeals decisions reviewed
in this study indicate a very careful consideration of the correctness of
the decision of the trial judge, and while -the affirmances predominate,32
there were several xeversals because of insufficient evidence.38
When -the common pleas court finds that the record supports the
agency decision, it has no jurisdiction to modify the agency order.34
Review of Agencies Governed by Other Statutes
Since several important state administrative agencies are not governed
by the Administrative Procedure Act,3 5 the scope of judicial review of
many administrative decisions must be determined from the basic statutes
applying to each agency or department of the state or local government.
The following cases involved judicial review of administrative action not
governed by the Procedure Act.
State v. HarrelP held that the action of a city manager and the city
civil service commission -in discharging a city employee would not be
disturbed when the charges made were sufficient for dismissal and there
was sufficient evidence in support of the charges. The Supreme Court
"See note 20, supra.
'Petropulos v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 141 N.E.2d 768 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
'Andrews v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 164 Ohio St. 275, 280, 131 N.E.2d 390, 393-
94 (1955); 1956 Survey, 8 W.EsT. REs. L. REV. 247, 248 (1957).
'National Fraternal Order of Draftees v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 139 N.E.2d 106
(Ohio Ct. App. 1953); Mullins v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 139 N.E.2d 870 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1954); 111 Bar, Inc. v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 144 N.E.2d 305 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1956); Liberty Club v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 144 N.E.2d 115 (Ohio Ct. App.
1956).
'Bd. of Liquor Control v. Walnut Cafe, 139 N.E.2d 55 (Ohio Ct. App. 1953);
Kosick v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 140 N.E.2d 62 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955); Brenner
v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 101 Ohio App. 550, 140 N.E.2d 626 (1955).
t4 Delmonte Cafe, Inc. v. Dep't. of Liquor Control, 141 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio Ct. App.
1956).
=Omo Rxv. CODE, § 119.01.
166 Ohio St. 437, 143 N.E.2d 577 (1957).
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will neither weigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of
the administrative officers and the lower court.
Under -the Ohio workmen's compensation statutes and the rules of the
Industrial Commission, a district board of claims has the responsibility
for deciding questions of fact relative to disputed claims, and the In-
dustrial Commission on appeal must accept the finding of the board un-
less it appears that the award, order or decision is clearly against the
weight of the evidence or contrary to law. It is an abuse of discretion
for the Industrial Commission to modify the board's award unless either
one or both conditions exist 37
State v. Corrigan38 involved judicial review of a decision of the trus-
tee of the police relief and pension fund of the City of Cleveland refus-
Ing benefits to a radio operator. State statutes vested authority in the
trustees to make rules and regulations for the distribution of the fund,
including the qualifications of beneficiaries. For a number of years,
the trustees had construed the board's rules as excluding persons of the
class to which the relator belonged. In denying a writ of mandamus,
the court of appeals found that the -board did not act arbitrarily or abuse
its discretion, and -the court chose the uniform construction of the rules
followed by the trustees.
City of Gallipolis v. State 9 involved a decision of the Water Pollu-
don Control Board, created under the Water Pollurion Control Act of
1951,40 denying renewal of a permit to discharge untreated sewage into
the Ohio River. The court of appeals affirmed the order of the Board,
holding that a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency when the decision of the agency is supported by substantial evi-
dence and made in accordance with law.4 '
'State v. Industrial Comm'n. of Ohio, 144 N.E.2d 117 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
The court of appeals allowed a writ of mandamus to compel reinstatement of the
original award in this case.
' 140 N.E.2d 40 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957). The court's opinion contains the follow-
ing significant paragraph:
While construction given to rules and regulations by boards of this charac-
ter is not conclusive upon courts, nevertheless it is entitled to weight and
consideration; and the practical interpretation placed upon these rules and
regulations by board members whose duty it is to administer and enforce
them, should not be lightly discarded.
*'103 Ohio App. 197, 145 N.E.2d 237 (1957).
10 OHIo REv. CODE, § 6111.01-.07.
'It should be noted that OHIO REV. CODE § 6111.06 provides that all proceedings
of the Water Pollution Control Board are subject to and governed by § 119.01-.13,
the Ohio Administration Procedure Act. The principal case does not discuss the
role of the common pleas court in considering the appeal from the board, previously
discussed in this article.
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Public Utilities Commission Action
Judicial review of the action of the Public Utilities Commission
covers both rate making and service orders.
In the fixing of rates the Commission exercises a legislative function,
and upon an appeal to -the Supreme Court, the sole issue -is -whether the
Commission has exercised proper judgment. 42 When the Commission
has exercised its delegated authority in accordance with the legislative
standards for its guidance, and the delegation by the General Assembly
does -not exceed its authority, the Supreme Court cannot find that the
order of the commission is either unreasonable or unlawful and must
therefore affirm it.4 s
New York Central R.R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission4" reiterates
that the Supreme Court will not substitute its judgment on questions of
fact for that of the Commission, and the record must show that the order
of the Commission is against the manifest weight of the evidence or is
otherwise unlawful or unreasonable, otherwise the order will -be affirmed.
Thus, -the service order will 'be affirmed when there is ample competent
evidence in the record to support and justify it.45 As the Supreme Court
said in Southern Ry. System v. Public Utilities Commission,4" 'the order
will be affirmed when it is not 'manifesdy against the weight of the
evidence.
Non-statutory Methods of Judicial Review
State v. Corrigan47 invoked the writ of mandamus as a method of
determining the validity of administrative action. Under Section 2731.05,
Ohio Revised Code, -the writ of mandamus will not lie where there is a
plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. This in-
"Industrial Protestants v. Public Utilities Comm'n., 165 Ohio St. 543, 138 N.E.2d
398 (1956). An effort was made in one case to connect the validity of Public Utili-
ties Commission rules with compliance with the rule making procedure of the Ohio
Administrative Procedure Act Its inapplicability to the Commission is obvious from
a reading of OHio REv. CODE § 119.01, but the Supreme Court felt it necessary to
so hold expressly in Akron & Barberton Belt R.R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n.,
165 Ohio St. 316, 135 N.E.2d 400 (1956).
" Citizens Gas Users Ass'n. v. Public Utilities Comm'n., 165 Ohio St. 536, 138 N.E.
2d 383 (1956).
" 166 Ohio St. 113, 139 N.E.2d 623 (1957).
'Ohio Central Telephone Corp. v. Public Utilities Comm'n., 166 Ohio St. 180, 140
NX.E.2d 782 (1957).
"166 Ohio St. 240, 141 N.E.2d 149 (1957).
" 140 N.E.2d 40 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957). For discussion, see note 38, supra.
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